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Abstract
In the process of accession to the European Union, Turkey has begun the process of creating the 
Regional Development Agencies (RDA) in 2006. Currently, twenty-six RDAs became operational. 
Furthermore, the creation of these RDAs must also be understood in the context of the country’s 
economic competitiveness policy. If economic regionalization will achieve these objectives, it must 
also meet the requirements of economic competitiveness and to those of governance. The question 
is to what extent Turkey, with a strong tradition of centralized administration is capable and ready to 
move towards a genuine decentralization policy that would support and encourage local and regional 
development initiatives avoiding centralizing reflexes of the political-administrative system. In this 
perspective, this work aims to study the concept of competitiveness and its involvement in territorial 
development policies in Turkey through the creation of regional development agencies. The issue will 
be addressed as part of a case study of ISTKA, the Istanbul Development Agency.
Keywords: Competitiveness, Regional Development Agencies, Governance, New Regionalism, City-
Regionalism, Centralism, Decentralization, European Union, Globalization, Istanbul
Rekabetedebilirlik Kavramı Işığında Türkiye’de Bölgesel Kalkınma 
Politikası ve İstanbul Kalkınma Ajansı Örneği
Öz
Avrupa Birliği’ne uyum süreci çerçevesinde Türkiye,  2006  yılından  itibaren   Kalkınma Ajansları’nı 
kurmaya başlamıştır. Hâlihazırda 26 Kalkınma Ajansı faal durumdadır. Bununla birlikte, 
Kalkınma Ajansları’nın kurulması Türkiye’nin ekonomik rekabetedebilirlik politikası ile de birlikte 
düşünülmelidir. Kalkınma Ajansları ile “ekonomik” bir bölgeselleşme siyaseti güdülmekte ve bu sayede 
hem rekabetedebilirliğin arttırılması hem de yönetişim yapılarının kurulması da hedeflenmektedir. 
Sorulması gereken soru, aşırı merkeziyetçi bir yönetim geleneğine sahip olan Türkiye’nin yerel 
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ve bölgesel kalkınma dinamiklerinin önünü açacak kapsamlı bir yerelleşme politikasını ve 
anlayışını hayata geçirip geçiremeyeceğidir. Merkeziyetçi refleksler, bölgesel ekonomik kalkınma ve 
rekabetedebilirliğin desteklenmesi önünde bir engel teşkil edebilmektedir. Bu bağlamda bu çalışma 
Türkiye’de rekabetedebilirlik kavramını bölgesel ekonomik kalkınma politikası çerçevesinde açıklamayı 
ve tartışmayı amaçlamaktadır. Bu çerçevede, İstanbul Kalkınma Ajansı örneği üzerinden de konu 
derinleştirilecek ve tartışmaya açılacaktır. 
Anahtar kelimeler: Rekabetedebilirlik, Bölgesel Kalkınma Ajansları, Yönetişim, Yeni Bölgecilik, 
Kent-Bölgecilik, Merkeziyetçilik, Avrupa Birliği, Küreselleşme, İstanbul
Introduction
“Until 2023, our goal is to reach $ 25,000 per capita income. In 13 years, our exports will exceed 
500 billion dollars thereshold and foreign trade volume will rise to $ 1 trillion.” 
These are the goals of Vision 2023 made by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Prime Minister of the time, 
in a speech in January 2011 in Ankara deal with members of his party. Ambitious goals but how 
to achieve them? Many government official documents such as strategic policy documents as 
well as many speeches made by representatives of the AKP emphasize the importance of the 
implementation of reforms targeting the institutional, administrative and economic structure of 
Turkey. Such an economic feat can be embodied in conditions of political, economic and financial 
stability supported by undergoing democratization reforms that would promote the entry and 
maintain of financial flows and foreign investment in the country.
To meet the requirements of economic globalization, of the European Union as well as those 
of national economic forces aspiring further integration into the international market, AKP is 
implementing many reforms in the institutional and administrative system since 2002. The policy 
of regional development is one of these reforms. The objective of reducing regional disparities 
exists in the political agenda of governments since the founding of the Republic. Moreover, the 
creation of the State Planning Organization (Devlet Plânlama Teşkilatı - DPT, actually Ministry 
of Development) in 1960 represents the concern and attention of the state related to regional 
inequalities. However, regional policy is no less characterized than other policies by the centralist 
character and culture of the state.
It was not until the opening of accession negotiations of Turkey to the European Union in 2004 
that a significant change has been possible. The creation of regional development agencies (RDAs) 
in 26 NUTS 2 regions in 2006 means the establishment of a new institutional structure and a new 
strategic approach to regional policy in Turkey. Characterized thus far by a top-down approach, 
concentrating all decision-making powers and expertise centrally in the DPT, regional policy is 
reconfigured with the policy of creating RDAs in the context of pre-accession to the European 
Union. Now, the regional plans are developed at the regional level through the participation of 
local actors which means decentralization of regional planning policy hitherto led by DPT. The 
financing problem regarding the achievement of goals set in these plans also appears solved by 
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concrete budgets accorded to RDAs. On the other hand, RDAs, coordinated by the Ministry of 
Development, are also present as institutions that are supposed to increase the competitiveness of 
Turkish regions beyond the objective of reducing regional disparities. The objective of improving 
the competitiveness of regions coincides with national economic objectives. The export-oriented 
economic growth policy implemented since the 1980s, but increased and strengthened by AKP 
governments since 2002, can achieve considerable performance with regional institutional bodies 
at territorial level. 
EU conditionality vis-à-vis its regional policy is not the only factor that mobilizes such change. 
Indeed, on the one hand, AKP seeks to support its economic development policies through the 
mobilization of local economic forces, on the other hand; these are also demanding institutional 
status as well as financial resources to stimulate local development in a bottom-up approach.
In a context of economic globalization and decentralization policies which are tending to 
highlight the regions and cities as centers of growth of globalized world economy, economic 
regionalization policy in Turkey through the creation of RDAs seeks to give a collective identity, 
organizational and financial resources to the localities in Turkey. We are still very far from evoking 
the existence of administrative or political regions, but it is a territorial institutionalization at 
NUTS 2 level, which could eventually build a more successful coordination between various 
levels of governance; national, regional and local. Indeed, competition and/or competitiveness 
are becoming the organizational and operational principles of its new structures at regional level.
But what is the source of this logic of competition affecting regions more so than the central 
level? What are its theoretical references? And territories, especially cities which regains their 
central role in the globalized economic competition, how this logic of competition is translated 
into action? Initially, this work will focus on these aspects of the concept. And secondly, the focus 
will be on the appropriation of competition as the new regulatory norm of regional policy in 
Turkey as well as its resonance with the centralist culture that still remains. Finally, the issue will 
be addressed through the example of Istanbul Development Agency (İstanbul Kalkınma Ajansı - 
ISTKA). What is the role of the ISTKA in the promotion and economic development of Istanbul 
vis-à-vis regional and international competition? How ISTKA lies in the governance system that 
connects local stakeholders (public-private) with the central authorities? What is its function in 
relation to major infrastructure projects that seem to transform Istanbul? How ISTKA acts to 
regenerate competitiveness? Implementing which policy tools? And what is its ability to perform 
as a collective actor?
The Concept of Competition and Spatial Development Policies
The Competition through New-Regionalist Approach
Globalization has been accompanied by the assertion and reassertion of agglomerative tendencies 
in many different areas of the world, in part because of the very openness and competitiveness 
that it ushers in (Scott, 1998; Puga and Venables, 1999). In recent years, the region has been 
Fethi Ufuk ÖZIŞIK
262
rediscovered as an important source of competitive advantage in a globalizing economy (Scott, 
1995; Cooke, 1997) In part, this rediscovery is based on studies of the success of highly dynamic 
regional economies and industrial districts which draw extensively upon local assets for their 
competitiveness. However, the rediscovery is also based on the insights of institutional economic 
theory, particularly its explanation of why territorial proximity matters for economic organization 
(Amin, 1999:368). 
Michael Storper has suggested that a distinctive feature of places in which globalization is 
consistent with the localization of economic activity is the strength of their “relational assets” 
or “untraded interdependencies”. These are assets which include tacit knowledge based on face-
to-face exchange, embedded routines, habits and norms, local conventions of communication 
and interaction, reciprocity and trust based on familiarity and so on. These relational assets are 
claimed to have a direct impact on a region’s competitive potential insofar as they constitute part 
of the learning environment of firms. (Amin, 1999:369) The contention of Krugman and Porter 
is that the spatial clustering of interrelated industries, skilled labor and technological innovations 
offers some of the key elements of growth and competitiveness. These include increasing returns, 
reduced transaction costs and economies associated with proximity and interfirm exchange, as 
well as specialized know-how, skills and technological advancement (Amin, 1999:368). 
The institutionalist geographers offers a much richer understanding of territorial proximity than 
that offered by endogenous growth theory, which continues to stress well-known but rather tired 
agglomeration factors. Proximity has come to be considered in ways which acknowledge the 
territorial parameters of the institutional and social sources of economic action (Barnes, 1995; 
Thrift and Olds, 1996). This includes the power of local rationalities and traditions of behavior, 
the properties of face-to-face networks and the quality of local institutions, social habits and 
conventions (Amin, 1999:370). 
According Ash Amin, the new regionalism implies practical action which transcends the 
limits of traditional local economic development initiatives. The focus falls on building the 
wealth of regions, with upgrading of the economic, institutional and social base considered as 
the prerequisite for entrepreneurial success. Thus, local effort might focus on developing the 
supply base and the institutional base (from development agencies to business organizations and 
autonomous political representation) in order to make particular sites into key staging points or 
centers of competitive advantage within global value chains (Amin, 1999:370). 
Much contemporary regionalism is concerned with localizing decision making in core institutions 
such as regional government, regional assemblies and regional development agencies. Such 
an institutional frame is believed to help build a locally integrated economic system gathered 
around the dynamics of clusters, local supply chains, and local knowledge transfer. In this politics 
of localism, now actively endorsed by the EU and many national governments, a strong link 
is predicated between the economic and the political, based on the establishment of a locally 
governed institutional structure to support a locally oriented economic system (OECD, 2001; 
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DETR, 1997; DTLR, 2001). The European Union has also been very active in promoting 
regionalization and regional governance in the candidate states Amin, 2008:6).
In particular, new regionalists go so far as to claim that contemporary capitalism and its territorial 
configuration are best regulated and governed in and through the decentralization of socio-
economic decision-making and associated policy implementation to sub-national institutional 
frameworks and supports (Cooke and Morgan, 1994; Florida, 1995; Storper, 1997; Scott, 1998)
Michael Keating traces the rise of the region to three interdependent political economic tensions. 
The first concerns a functional restructuring. Here, under conditions of intensified economic 
globalization - not least the ‘threat to exit’ exercised by capital (Fox Piven, 1995, cited in Kelly, 
1999) - nation-states are no longer perceived to be capable of managing their economies through 
redistributive policies and the strategic placement of public investments. The second refers to 
institutional restructuring, where a decentralization of governance might be conducted: (1) in 
the name of modernization; (2) as a response to pressure from regional political movements; 
or (3) as a means to enhance national political power by devolving the responsibility to regional 
stakeholders. Finally, the third identifies political mobilizations enacted by strategically significant 
communities of interest, whether in the name of nationalism or regionalism. Keating (1998:14) 
goes on to argue that ‘as the state is penetrated by the market and by international regimes, 
territories are remolded and regional actors forced into a more direct relationship with the 
external world’. Scott (1998) raises comparable themes when discussing a ‘spatial mismatch’ 
between the sovereign state and the organizational features of modern capitalism, giving rise 
to a fourfold spatial hierarchy: the global level, multinational blocs like the European Union, 
sovereign states and regions (MacLeod, 2001:814)
“Entrepreneurial Cities” in the Globalization Context: From Competitive Regions to 
Competitive City-Regions
In what remains the most comprehensive account documenting the rise to prominence of city-
regions in the global economy, Allen Scott’s book ‘Global City- Regions’ argues how, when 
presented together, ‘city regions are coming to function as the basic motors of the global economy, 
a proposition that points as a corollary to the further important notion that globalization and 
city-region development are but two facets of a single integrated reality’ (Scott, 2001:4).
Under the titles of ‘global city-regions’ (Scott, 2001) and the new ‘city regionalism’ (Ward 
and Jonas, 2004), there has been a growing support for a resurgence of city-regions within 
economic geography. Moving away from new regionalist accounts claiming that contemporary 
capitalism and its territorial configuration were best regulated and governed in and through the 
decentralization of socioeconomic decision-making and associated policy implementation to 
regional institutional frameworks and supports, it is now city-regions that are seen to ‘function as 
territorial platforms for much of the post-Fordist economy that constitutes the dominant leading 
edge of contemporary capitalist development and as an important staging post for the operation 
of multinational corporations’ (Scott, 2001:4).
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The focus on the concept of the city-region has partially been a reaction to the views of globalization 
that emphasized the idea that “location no longer matters” (O’Brien 1992:73). Although the 
combination of technical progress and de-regulation has greatly enhanced the mobility of goods, 
labour, capital, and knowledge, this has neither implied the ubiquity of economic activity, nor 
undermined the need for urban concentration (Scott et al., 2001:15). In fact, the increasing 
mobility of factors has provoked a restructuring of economic activity that has benefited city-
regions which “come to function increasingly as the regional motors of the global economy, that 
is, as dynamic local networks of economic relationships caught up in more extended world-
wide networks of inter-regional competition and exchange” (Scott et al., 2001:16). From this 
perspective, the prosperity of large populations living not just in core cities, but also in small, 
distant urban areas and rural locations has come to be regarded as dependent on the dynamism 
and prosperity of city-regions (Deas & Giordano, 2003).
The minimum common denominator of virtually all definitions of a city-region is the presence 
of a core city linked by functional ties to a hinterland. The nature of those ties varies from one 
definition to another, but generally includes a combination of economic, housing market, travel-
to-work, marketing, or retail catchment factors. Other authors even include identity and the 
social and cultural domination by the core city as essential elements of a city-region (Davoudi, 
2003:986). However, even the combination of an urban core and a semi-urban and rural 
hinterland as the essence of a city-region is often modified. The urban core is, at times, substituted 
by multiple cores, making the city-region a polycentric geographical unit (Scott et al., 2001:11; 
Faludi, 2002; Parr, 2003; ODPM, 2005) which frequently leads to the formation of networked 
mega-city regions (Hall & Pain, 2006). 
City-region proponents - and, in particular, American “new regionalists”- make a clear 
distinction between governance and government, putting greater emphasis on the former as a 
way to promote voluntary cooperation across metropolitan areas in order to make them more 
competitive (Savitch & Vogel, 2000; Norris, 2001). Second, the city-region is regarded as the 
economic locomotive in a globalized world (Hall, 1998; MacLeod, 1999; Scott, 2001b; Scott et al., 
2001; Scott & Storper, 2003), with the welfare and prosperity of large territories dependent on the 
success of its core and on that of neighboring city-regions. And finally, the city-region framework 
is considered as the ideal scale for policy intervention in a globalized world (Ohmae, 1995, 2001; 
Keating, 1998; Tomaney & Ward, 2000; MacLeod, 2001; Scott et al., 2001).
To better understand the characteristics of city-regions, it is also appropriate to bring the look 
on the concept of “entrepreneurial city”, developed by Patrick Le Galès. According to Le Galès, 
the metaphor of the entrepreneurial city is characterized by three elements: the discourse of 
competition and the market, including in terms of image and identity, the political priority 
given to economic development issues and attraction of investment, favored social groups, 
the transformation of local government to the type of organizational forms public-private 
partnership that give private actors an important role in defining the general interest of the city, 
priorities, management methods as well as in the design and implementation of projects (Le 
Galès, 2003:287).
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According to the competition credo, cities would do well to improve their position on the prestige 
scales, wealth and political weight in the international long term competition. D. Harvey (1989) 
identified the different dimensions of this pressure in terms of competition to attract investment, 
affluent social groups and visitors and implications for urban policy. (Le Galès, 2003:287-288).




Cities are trying to build as consumer center (commercial and leisure complex centers, shows, 
major urban projects, culture) as the command center (headquarters of major companies, 
government agencies). They implement policies to become attractive with regard to investors and 
people: urban planning, social policy, image, culture, everything would be reviewed in the light 
of the requirements of competition ... which is not benign because this implies social transfers, 
modification of public intervention in favor of private, reallocations in favor of targeted groups 
(Le Galès, 2003:288).
Success in competition is gradually gaining ground as a principle of legitimizing of public action, 
it has naturalized as a binding constraint. Once launched the dynamics of competition, and 
whatever the evolution of transnational investment flows, means are more and more importantly 
mobilized to attract investments. All investment projects attracted in a city allows a much better 
staging of elites which presenting the city with a vibrant image and with a status of “winner.” (Le 
Galès, 2003:288).
Consequently, cities once structured by the Keynesian state and industrial capitalism become 
“entrepreneurial cities” that adapt both to the demands of globalized capitalism, to the organized 
mobility within the European Union and to the discipline imposed by the competitive state 
(Strange, 1993; Cerny, 1989).
Furthermore, given the significant increase of market logic by the globalization processes, the 
logic of competition has emerged strongly as a structuring principle of coordination of social and 
political actors. This competition is accompanied by discourse production, strengthening social 
groups, changing the relationship between politics and policy, as well as the exclusion of other 
groups, policies, and ideas, in other words, strengthening entrepreneurial forms of governance 
favoring the dominance of new urban oligarchies. However, according to Le Gales, beyond the 
competition, various forms of regulation exist also in European cities such as the development 
of anti-poverty strategies; the regulation of real estate markets; the reinvention of culture and 
identity and mobilization of local society by urban projects (Le Galès, 2003:304-319).
Regional Development Agencies (RDAs): Institutional Tools for Competitive Regions and 
Entrepreneurial Cities across EU context and Globalization
RDAs are as a practical implementation of certain orientations of the new regionalism and post-
Fordism. According Aytül Güneşer Demirci, development model proposed by the RDAs draws 
particularly the contributions of new public management and those of the notion of governance 
that emerged in the 1980s and 1990s. The development model is based on the RDAs disqualifies the 
objective of reducing regional inequalities in favor of the objective of strengthening interregional 
competition. In this regard, this model proposes to delegate more executive and administrative 
expertise to the private sector. Furthermore, it highlights the need to allocate a certain autonomy 
to RDAs vis-à-vis their relations with the central government. (Özışık, 2012:144)
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The principles of action of RDAs are as follows:
- The public sector is no longer the main player economic development. Public investment 
should be limited to investments of infrastructure
- The economic and structural development must be led by the private sector.
- Support companies that focus on exports at the expense of those that focus on the domestic 
market.
- Minimizing bureaucratic and administrative procedures which are facing entrepreneurs 
and investors.
- Support local businesses, especially SMEs, until they get a certain capacity for 
competitiveness.
- Strengthening local human resources by cooperative forms of action to accelerate the 
establishment of industries (Özışık, 2012:145).
With the creation of RDAs, according Aytül Güneşer Demirci, leadership of local actors replaces 
the main role of the central state. It is adopting a bottom-up approach to regional development 
policies. Thus, in the context of global economic competition, the regions are forced to give the 
best investment conditions to foreign and domestic companies through RDAs (Özışık, 2012:145).
The creation of the first RDAs in Western Europe in the 1950s and 1960s, aimed at reducing the 
negative effects of the Second World War and to adapt to technological advances that develop in 
the world. According Koray Karasu, from the years 1980 and 1990, the rise of the ‘region’ (mainly 
in the direction of economic regionalization) can be explained by the emergence of economic 
and social cohesion policy the EU. Since 75% of the EU acquis is devoted to legislation on local 
and regional levels of administration, the EU appears as a supranational actor that promotes 
regionalization policies and plays an important role in promoting the “regions”. Some believe that 
the RDAs are as an institutional project for strengthening integration and European construction 
(Özışık, 2012:146).
RDAs, through their institutional and technical capacity, contributed to the development of 
disadvantaged areas by offering them the structural funds. Currently in the EU countries, there 
are more than two hundred RDAs working at the national level, at the city level, the departmental 
level as well as international level. Their statutes and organizational structures vary in each 
country (Gençyürek, 2006).
According to the definition of the EURADA, a RDA is defined as:
“a RDA is an operational structure that identifies sectoral or overall development problems, 
chooses a range of opportunities or methodologies for their solution and promotes projects 
which can maximize the solutions to the problems (EURADA, 1999)”.
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In this perspective, RDAs implement work such as collecting information and data available to 
local authorities and businesses; infrastructure development for environmental protection; the 
favoring and strengthening of local assets such as tourism; the construction of industrial and 
technological parks, construction of innovation centers and business etc. In addition, most of the 
RDAs seek to attract foreign investment. For this, they establish specialized offices which, due, 
working with national institutions. They prepare information guides for investors and they also 
participate in trade fairs.
One of the main differences of RDAs lies in their relationship with the national government. 
EURADA classifies agencies according to their reports to the state in terms of political, 
organizational and financial dependence: 
“A basic distinction between RDA scan be drawn by their positions either inside or outside 
the core administrative apparatus of politically elected government. Political sponsors 
can be at the local, regional and national actors. A development body incorporated into a 
government structure is likely to be subjected to a high degree of political control. However, 
agencies established by central governments have the advantage of resources available for 
their objectives. Moreover, agencies existing inside local and regional authorities have closer 
to the local realities but dependency on bureaucratic channels tends to transform them into 
less operational organizations and agencies established by local/regional authorities can make 
quicker decisions and less dependent on political attitudes (EURADA, 1999)”.
These are the characteristics and modus operandi of the RDAs. In this perspective, it would be 
interesting to wear the look on those of RDAs established in Turkey. The competition occupies an 
important place as an organizational and operational norm. However, the relationship of RDAs 
with the central government remains problematic and this delineates the scope of their role and 
their capacity for action at the territorial level in terms of regional development.
Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) in Turkey: The Goal of Competitiveness 
versus Centralist Ways of Doing
The creation of the RDAs in Turkey means a significant change in terms of regional development 
policy. Institutional change to the extent that the creation of RDAs refers to a regionalization 
of the regional planning policy. Now, the regional plans are developed and implemented by the 
participation and mobilization of local actors. So in this sense, the central level’s authority is 
limited to approve the final version of the regional plans prepared by RDAs. Operational change 
to the extent that RDAs are regional institutions with an organizational structure and financial 
resources to implement operations for achieving the goals agreed by regional actors in regional 
development plans. A strategic change in that the goal of regional development policy is no 
longer limited to the reduction of regional disparities, but is also moving towards improving the 
competitiveness of regions at the national level, a competition among Turkish regions but also at 
international level, which refers to the improvement of regional competitiveness at international 
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level in the context of a globalized economy where regions or city-regions occupy a place and a 
role more and more assertive.
The Approval of Competition as a Major Norm of Regional Development Policy in 
Turkey through the Creation of RDAs
According to Faruk Ataay, in Turkey, from the 1980s, the role of private sector in economic growth 
becomes paramount, and state’s intervention in the economy is questioned. The central role of the 
state is gradually replacing by an approach giving a greater role to the private sector in economic 
growth. The intervention of the state is challenged also territorially. This change does not hide 
the interventions of the central state but redefines and redirects that ones. The role of the central 
state boils down to facilitate and encourage private sector investment in development policies and 
gradually detaching from these Keynesian economic functions that become ineffective (Özışık, 
2012:136).
We can grasp the concrete resonances of this economic policy change of the state concerning 
RDAs from the 8th Five Year Plan (2001-2005), and these are growing particularly in the 
Preliminary National Development Plan (PNDP - 2004-2006) and the 9th National Development 
Plan (2007-2013). In the 8th Five Year Plan, planners of DPT emphasize the role of the forces and 
local dynamics in economic development as well as in global competition in the early notations 
concerning regional development component. This approach is gaining more importance in the 
PNDP (2004-2006) and in the 9th National Development Plan (2007-2013) which are prepared 
during the pre-accession process to the EU. Second, unlike the previous five-year plans that 
focused particularly on interventions and public subsidies through infrastructure investment and 
incentive policies in disadvantaged regions, the 8th Plan, PNDP and the 9th Plan now focus on 
the concepts “competition”, “competitiveness” and “efficiency”(Özışık, 2012:137-139).
To reduce regional inequalities, achieve top-down government interventions are no longer 
the only way forward. The new approach claims that the adoption of the logic of competition 
between regions can mobilize better management and optimization of local resources based 
on their endogenous socio-economic potential. The acceptance of these new standards is also 
associated with the process of pre-accession process to the EU and that of globalization. In many 
official documents and reports of DPT, since the 8th five-year plan, it is possible to observe an 
effort to legitimize these new approaches, addressing the imperatives of globalization process and 
pre-accession process to the EU (Özışık, 2012:137).
“Globalization and global capitalism are binding on states and it is essential to take into account 
the external environment in the formulation of solutions that one seeks to solve problems. We 
must accept the reality and react intelligently. Today, we do not just focus on the objective of 
reducing regional inequalities; we also seek to strengthen the competitiveness of regions in a 
global competition. Our development agencies respect this logic” (Interview with the Head of 
Regional Development Department in DPT, 2009).
At the same time a new perception of the region concept emerged in the cognitive frameworks of 
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planners from the 8th Five Year Plan. They emphasize the catalytic role of RDAs that they observe 
in other countries in terms of economic development, in the economic globalization era. The 
Plan establishes detailed analyzes of the RDAs which are in different countries, particularly those 
in the EU by focusing on the famous concept “Europe of regions”(Özışık, 2012:138).
“(...) At present, in the context of European integration, it is the rise of ‘regions’ as the most 
important administrative units. The general policy orientation is characterized by strengthening 
the autonomy of the regions and their vis-à-vis attractiveness for foreign investment. In 
this perspective, the regions are involved in the economic competition creating their own 
organizational bodies.” (8th Five Year Plan, DPT).
Otherwise, it is also important to ask this question: What governance system is envisaged to 
apply this logic of competition in the context of regional development policy? The law sets up 
a system of local governance favoring a confirmed collaboration of regional elites: state actors 
of local level (governors, mayors and other representatives of local public institutions) and 
economic actors (firms, companies, and local entrepreneurs, business associations especially 
chambers of commerce and of industry) constitute the Administration Boards of RDAs. In this 
context, a public-private partnership was established largely excluding the participation of civil 
society and representatives of the working classes such as trade unions or non-profit associations. 
Some of these actors are represented in Development Councils of RDAs which seek to reward 
the democratic deficit of Administration Boards. In this sense, “urban oligarchies” are bringing 
together the main holders of public power and local economic forces. This is not a surprise since 
the state give importance and major role to the private sector in achieving economic development 
policies since 1980’s. RDAs therefore also become institutionalized in this logic through their 
organizational and relational structure.
The Centralized Regulation of RDAs Running and Financing Undermining Competition
Even if the creation of RDAs means a sort of devolution in terms of regional planning and 
institutionalization of governance in terms of gathering public and private actors at the local level, 
centralist logic persists. First, the decision to establish RDAs is remained to the decision of Council 
of Ministers which may at any time take the decision to close these RDAs. Furthermore, in Turkey, 
the policy of RDAs is characterized by a top-down approach in that there is no organizational or 
financial flexibility. All RDAs are structured in the same way and must comply with the general 
guidelines that are decided by the central authorities. RDAs also face considerable administrative 
tutelage. The Ministry of Development, beyond its role as supervisor and coordination, can 
sanction RDAs at the expense of decisions taken by their Administrative Boards, based on an 
administrative oversight mechanism written into the law establishing RDAs. Moreover, while 
regional development plans are now prepared by RDAs, they do not have a constraint on the 
decisions of other local institutions and those of central institutions. 
The funding modality of RDAs is a major handicap that affects the objective of reducing regional 
disparities as well as the competitiveness of regions. While a part of the RDA’s funding comes from 
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the budget of the central government, the rest comes from local partners (municipalities, special 
provincial administrations, chambers of commerce and chambers of industry). While Ministry 
of Development is programming allocations becoming from the central government according 
to the socio-economic parameters which allows allocating more funding to disadvantaged areas, 
what is lacking in terms of competitiveness and equality of opportunity regarding RDAs, it is the 
relative contribution of local institutions. 
A city that is a member of an RDA being in a less developed region does not have a municipality 
or a chamber of commerce that could allocate considerable financial resources as would be the 
case in a more prosperous region. 
In this sense, the difference is striking between the western regions and eastern regions. 
According to a technician of the Istanbul Development Agency (İstanbul Kalkınma Ajansı - 
ISTKA), standardized financial regulation of RDAs favors already developed regions more than 
disadvantaged regions. And this situation is not compatible with the objective of reduction of 
regional disparities neither with that of regional competitiveness:
“Many municipalities that are situated in eastern regions don’t have enough financial resources 
for paying their own contributions to RDA’s budget. They have low financial incomes. In 
fact, this is really problematic about the competitiveness of regions. Why? There is 26 RDAs 
in Turkey. My personal opinion is that: Local contributions should be collected centrally, in 
Ankara and after that central authority could grant the money fairly in direction to the less 
developed regions of Turkey. It is the same logic with the EU regional policy, as in Structural 
Funds financial organization.  For example, the city of Hakkari… Hakkari is a member of 
Doğu Anadolu Kalkınma Ajansı - DOKA, RDA of Eastern Anatolia… This region is the least 
developed region of Turkey. Local institutions as municipalities or chambers of commerce 
don’t have important financial resources. So, Ministry of Development, inevitably, finances 
approximately 90% of their budget. In my opinion, this situation is not compatible with the 
philosophy of the law establishing RDAs. Actually, this financial regulation system undermines 
the objectives of the law, regional competitiveness and/or reducing regional disparities. In fact, 
in this logic, the financial resources of rich regions remain again in these regions. So, how 
we could finance and realize necessary projects in less developed regions? Rich regions are 
getting much more developed while less developed regions keep their disadvantaged financial 
conditions. In these conditions, how less developed regions could compete with the other ones?” 
(Interview with a technician of ISTKA - Istanbul Development Agency, 29.03.2015).
This financial regulation problem is not the only component of the top-down approach of 
RDA’s legislation that prevents eventual reconfigurations or more flexible operating procedures 
according to the socio-economic conditions of different regions.
 “There are significant problems. The RDA’s system is configured by a top-down approach. The 
issue of regional disparities in Turkey is a popular item of political discourses. However, each 
RDA is subject to the same regulations centrally defined that does not take into account local 
conditions. If an eastern region truly enjoys financial provisions carried by the law that did not 
exist before, a western region more developed than those in the east, feels limited or constrained 
by the limited features of the law in relation to its institutional and economic capacities. So 
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there is no flexibility. On the one hand, the law does not allow an operational flexibility to 
RDAs, on the other hand, apart from a few exceptions such as RDA of İzmir, it is not the 
local actors who have contributed to the creation of their own agencies. So, local actors often 
struggle to become familiar with their RDAs.” (Interview with a technician of ISTKA – Istanbul 
Development Agency, 29.03.2015).
Regarding the financing of RDAs, it is also important to highlight the weakness of their budgets 
compared to other local institutions. Furthermore, if a comparison is made between a western 
RDA, such ISTKA with an eastern RDA, like Ipekyolu Development Agency (which is constituted 
by the cities of Gaziantep, Kilis and Adıyaman), it is possible to observe the limited financial 
resources of the less developed regions compared to those of relatively rich regions. ISTKA has 
an annual budget of approximately 100 million TL while Ipekyolu Development Agency has an 
annual budget of 40-65 million TL. In this sense, the budgets allocated to RDAs seem to be lacking 
in terms of the objective of reducing regional disparities and in terms of regional competitiveness. 
How an economically disadvantaged region could compete with a favored region in these 
financial conditions? Especially, how to reduce regional inequalities with a financial system that 
is so lacking? We think that the decision-makers could reconsider this lacking parts of the RDA’s 
legislation.  
Beyond these top-down regulation problems, another aspect of the centralist approach that 
challenges the relative autonomy and power of RDAs is reflected at the consideration of regional 
development plans as guiding documents. Other local institutions or especially the central 
authorities do not take into consideration, in many cases, main guidelines and local strategies 
described in regional development plans prepared by RDAs. 
“Other local institutions or central authorities take rarely into consideration our regional 
plans. The planning philosophy in Turkey remains still highly centralized. Central authorities 
have always the last word. Many central decisions do not respect local priorities or precisions. 
Ministries or other central authorities play a more decisive role in the programming and 
implementation of investments that are realized at territorial level. In Turkey, there is not a 
multi-level governance system as in the EU. For example, the government strengthened the 
Ministry of Environment and Urban Planning in the spatial planning hierarchy. This Ministry 
has developed and wanted to set up a spatial plan that is not consistent with our regional 
development plan. Indeed, the Ministry of Development said that their plan is not consistent 
with that of the RDA. So which plan will be implemented? In fact, Council of State blocked 
the implementation of the spatial plan prepared by the Ministry of Environment and Urban 
Planning. (…) So, in Turkey, even if local actors define their own priorities or objectives, the 
central authorities has the final word in decision-making processes. I think that centralist 
approach is growing in Turkey. It is not complying with multi-level governance logic” (Interview 
with a technician of ISTKA – Istanbul Development Agency, 29.03.2015).
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The Case of Istanbul Development Agency (İstanbul Kalkınma Ajansı - ISTKA): A 
Small Shareholder of the Competitiveness Goal for Istanbul
The choice of ISTKA as a case study in this work is the result of some reasoning. Istanbul is the 
most developed city of Turkey and represents many advantages in terms of competitiveness as 
well as specific handicaps related to the high density of its population and its size leads us to 
consider Istanbul as a city-region. 
ISTKA is an institution that was founded in 2008, is a partner of the governance system in 
relation to Istanbul. ISTKA is created with a decision of the Council of Ministers and is not 
the result of mobilization of local actors. ISTKA, beyond its financial resources and its relative 
institutional and administrative capacity, plays a relatively small role in the development and 
implementation of policies aimed at developing the Istanbul region. In this part of this work, we 
will try to demonstrate the relevance of these findings that seem evident.
The Meaning of Competitiveness in Istanbul towards National and Global contexts
The main document that can tell us about the objective of improving the competitiveness of 
Istanbul is the regional development plan prepared by ISTKA. ISTKA prepared two regional 
development plans since its establishment in 2008. The first includes the period 2010-2013, the 
second includes the current period, 2014-2023. We will consider the second that is the actual 
plan.
It is in the first development guideline of the plan that can be found the concept of competitiveness:
“A Decisive Actor in Global Economy, Providing High Economic Profit, Innovative and 
Creative Economy” (http://www.istka.org.tr/content/pdf/2014-2023-istanbul-Bolge-Plani.
pdf :58-147)
1. Strategic Actor In Global Economy
2. Competitive Status In Global Value Chain
3. Industrial Transformation
4. Growing Research-Development and Innovation
5. Qualified Entrepreneurship
6. Transforming Labor, Developing and Growing Employment
7. Active Promotion and City’s Image
The objectives and preferences listed above are similar to those of many global city-regions. We can 
see that the notion of city’s competitiveness apprehended in Patrick Le Galès work does resonance 
with the regional development plan of ISTKA. ISTKA consider Istanbul as a strategic player in 
the global economy and defines a vision of development based on improving its competitiveness 
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with reference to the industrial innovation policy, research and development investments, and 
attraction of qualified labor and promotion of Istanbul’s image in the international arena.
However, if competitiveness is one of the key concepts of this first part of the plan, it refers more 
to compete with other global city-regions than to an interregional competition to be held in 
Turkey. This is because Istanbul is already by far the most developed region of the country that 
has no potential rival. Istanbul is the locomotive of the Turkish economy.
“At the national level, to compete with other RDAs is not a priority for us as Istanbul, from an 
economic point of view, is by far the most developed region of the country. In this perspective, 
our priority is to improve the competitiveness of Istanbul vis-à-vis other major world cities.” 
(Interview with a technician of ISTKA - Istanbul Development Agency, 29.03.2015).
“Istanbul is more in competition with other global cities. Istanbul is located near the middle of the 
world global-cities ranking, and Istanbul seeks to occupy a superior place. Istanbul has regional 
rivals but also international rivals.” (Interview with General Secretary of ISTKA - 02.04.2015).
Istanbul is a significant commercial and economic center in that a majority of headquarters of 
large firms are located in Istanbul, which is not the case for most other regions of Turkey.
“In Turkey, production plants are now generally located outside of Istanbul, in Tekirdağ in 
Trakya, in Manisa or in Denizli ... However, the headquarters of this firms that manage these 
investments are located in in Istanbul. This is a great advantage for Istanbul. In addition, the 
financial capital not only manages its investments located in Turkey but also those who are 
situated in the Caucasus, North Africa, and Middle East region. In this perspective, Istanbul is 
as a decision center for large international firms. So, Istanbul also receives tax revenues from 
these large companies.” (Interview with General Secretary of ISTKA - 02.04.2015).
Attracting foreign direct investment is also a component of the competitiveness policy for 
Istanbul.
“In terms of attracting foreign investment, we are competing with countries like Poland; Hungary 
... Turkey has no real rivals in the Middle East or North Africa. We compete in particular with 
the countries of the European Union. In this perspective, Istanbul is very efficient.” (Interview 
with General Secretary of ISTKA - 02.04.2015).
Istanbul also benefits from the human resources that put it in a much more advantageous position 
compared to other Turkish regions.
“Another advantage of Istanbul is the skilled labor. In other words, Istanbul is the most favorable 
region in terms of human resources compared to other parts of the country. In Istanbul, there 
are more than 50 universities.  In this perspective, even if a large company makes a particular 
investment in Anatolia, it focuses its research and development activities in Istanbul.” (Interview 
with General Secretary of ISTKA - 02.04.2015).
So, in a context where Istanbul has already reached a level of economic development in terms of 
industries, service sector, exports and attracting foreign investment, what is that role assigned 
to ISTKA? In fact, if ISTKA has a budget of about 100 million TL per year, ISTKA is not an 
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institution that realize large investments, its role and its ability to act in competitiveness of 
Istanbul, is specifically limited to assembling regional elites and to its financial support programs 
allowing local actors to implement their own projects which are financing by ISTKA.
In this sense, the strategy adopted by ISTKA is to focus on specific topics that could reward 
deficiencies that would result from such large-scale regional economy.
The two main areas of intervention which are favored by ISTKA are social development and the 
creative industries. Beyond the economic objectives that would favor the economic interests of 
regional elites, the focus on these two subjects demonstrates that various forms of regulation 
coexist with conventional development priorities and economic growth. Moreover, it shows that 
the competitiveness of a region cannot be reduced to economic growth but should also consider 
improving social and environmental conditions and supporting for artistic, innovative and 
cultural creativity of city’s residents. 
“We consider that ISTKA should not be interested in everything related to economic 
development. ISTKA should focus on specific topics. For example, ISTKA has yet to take 
a direct role in the economic development policies? Or would it be better for him to draw 
attention to social problems that are generated by the regional economy. In my opinion, this 
approach should be favored.” (Interview with a technician of ISTKA - Istanbul Development 
Agency, 29.03.2015).
“One of the areas preferred by ISTKA is that of the creative industries. In this direction, we 
call for projects several times. Moreover, we can very easily beneficiaries in the field of social 
development. This subject raises serious attention to local actors. This is also part of the 
discussions held in the meetings of our Administration Board. You know, the members of this 
Board largely represent the interests of the private sector. But the Prefect who is the chairman 
of the Board reflects its interest regarding social development at every opportunity. In the 
medium term, ISTKA can become one of the main institutions involved in social development.” 
(Interview with a technician of ISTKA - Istanbul Development Agency, 02.04.2015).
“If you talk about competitiveness, it is not just about economic development. The quality of 
life, social life, the environment, transportation ... The competitiveness cannot be understood 
without paying attention to all that. You must attract and integrate skilled people into the local 
economy to improve competitiveness. A metropolis like Istanbul should create added value. Since 
2010, we are working in the field of creative industries. We made calls for projects. The creative 
industries are among the priorities of our regional development plan. The creative industries 
are related to 13 sectors: architecture, design, performing arts, fashion is included. These are 
sectors where creativity plays an important role. In fact, if a global city needs to differentiate 
itself from other global cities, it must promote and support these creative industries. So attract 
this class called “creative” is of major importance. To attract these people is not enough; we 
must also keep them in the city, establishing suitable conditions to enable them to implement 
their creativity. What are these conditions? Freedom of expression, renovation and highlighting 
the cultural structure of the city ... Istanbul has real assets in this direction. For example, Pera; 
Beyoglu and Galata ... These people usually live in these historic neighborhoods that provide a 
cultural and artistic inspiration. So we must value at any time cultural and artistic potential of 
the city ... All this contributes to the competitiveness of the city.” (Interview with a technician of 
ISTKA - Istanbul Development Agency, 02.04.2015).
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The Centralized Approach of Big Projects Concerning Istanbul’s Competitiveness and 
ISTKA’s Role: A Weak Governance 
The powers and functions of the ISTKA regarding regional development are defined in the RDA’s 
law. Its competences and financial resources are not negligible. A priori, it is ISTKA that defines 
the vision and the strategies to follow in the medium and long term regarding the development 
of Istanbul. The preparation of the regional development plan, collecting information related to 
socioeconomic situation of the region, the organization of statistical data, financing local projects 
and more, setting coordination of regional actors through participatory procedures represent the 
ability and skills of ISTKA in regional governance. 
But is that really ISTKA plays an important role in the decision-making process regarding major 
policies that contribute to economic development in the Istanbul region? If the state, with the 
creation of RDAs, had the objective of establishing an intermediate level of governance between 
the local and central level to conduct, by a more decentralized way, its territorial policies, the 
current situation, particularly in the case of Istanbul, is controversy.
The Istanbul governance system brings together many stakeholders (public and private), and 
many institutions. Metropolitan Municipality and the Prefecture of Istanbul are the two local 
public institutions. The organization and structure of the municipality is established by the local 
elections, while the Prefect is therefore the central government representative. Second, these 
are semi-public bodies such as the Chamber of Commerce or Chamber of Industry bringing 
together key territorial economic actors. Finally, we can add the existence of civil society 
organizations, associations and unions. All these actors and institutions represent the horizontal 
governance. Moreover, ISTKA is supposed to regroup and make all these actors work together 
there. Within its Administration Board and its Development Council, the institutionalization 
of this governance seems to happen. But at the same time, there is also vertical governance that 
connects local actors and institutions with the central authorities; government, ministries and 
other central bodies. What is interesting to study in this perspective, it is the type of relationship 
that is being established between the central and local levels of government. ISTKA constitutes 
an intermediate level, or we can say the regional level. However, its status and autonomy remain 
problematic. First, ISTKA is the place setting coordination of regional actors, on the other hand, 
ISTKA is strictly tied to the central government to the extent that the Ministry of Development 
can control and redirect all its actions. The crucial question that can arise in terms of the famous 
problem of the Turkish administrative system, called as the dilemma between centralization and 
decentralization, is whether ISTKA is a real territorial institution or not, who can identify local 
needs and strategies and then guide other local and central institutions in the general direction 
decided in its regional development plan.
As we have mentioned several times in the text, Istanbul is the locomotive of the Turkish 
economy. In this sense, Istanbul is a center of interest to the central government to accelerate 
the country’s economic development. In this perspective, Istanbul stands as the core piece of the 
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competitiveness of the Turkish economy. So while since the first administrative reforms of the 
AKP in 2003, a process of decentralization began gradually in place, the central state interventions 
are still omnipresent and decisive in Istanbul. 
Indeed, the reflexes of the centralist culture of the state persist and can be observed easily in 
Istanbul. It is always the central authorities who make the important decisions, including those 
of major investments that would transform land use and the economic structure of the Istanbul 
region. Local institutions like the Metropolitan Municipality or as ISTKA are rarely solicited in 
such decision-making process. Such decisions are often made by not respecting the land use 
plans developed by local institutions or the regional development plan prepared by ISTKA. 
The central government is considering the implementation of various large-scale investments 
in Istanbul. In recent years, Istanbul has been the target of major infrastructure investments, 
transportation projects and construction of residential and commercial centers. The construction 
of the Third Bosphorus Bridge, the Third Airport Project or “crazy” Canal Istanbul Project 
represent only the vanguard of economic aspirations that will play a role in the construction of 
the “New Turkey”, a slogan that has now become an ambitious political project in the eyes of the 
AKP government and the President, Mr. Recep Tayyip Erdogan.
The guidelines set out in the regional development plan of the ISTKA or in the urban plan of the 
metropolitan municipality seem to be disregarded in relation to these investment decisions.
“Other local institutions and central authorities must respect and take into consideration our 
regional development plan or the urban plan of metropolitan municipality. Mr. Kadir Topbas, 
Mayor of Istanbul fought hard for acceptance of the urban plan. There was so much discussion 
and political fights about this plan. You know, the Metropolitan Municipality is governed by 
the AKP, but it is the AKP that violates a plan that was decided locally by its own members. 
The ISTKA’s regional plan and the urban plan suggested strictly not touching the North forests 
of Istanbul for the preservation of the environment and nature. While to build the third bridge 
or third airport, you see that these areas are affected by these investments. Finally, institutions, 
juridical regulations and plans do not count towards the central state. The central government 
has created RDAs, central government has given many powers and financial resources to 
local institutions, but it is still the central government that does not respect them. The central 
authority decides everything. If you want to put a regional development policy, you need to 
work with local institutions and listen to them. » (Interview with a technician of ISTKA – 
Istanbul Development Agency, 29.03.2015).
A major urban project that aims to improve the competitiveness of Istanbul but also the 
competitiveness of the Turkish economy is the project of Istanbul International Financial Center1. 
1 The vision of Istanbul International Financial Center project is defined as “Istanbul will become a regional, and then 
a global financial center”. Strategies aimed at developing the conditions required for Istanbul to rank among the 
leading financial centers of the world were covered in the Ninth Development Plan for the years 2007-2013 under 
the title “Istanbul International Financial Center”. Istanbul International Financial Center Strategy and Action Plan 
(Strategy and Action Plan) was approved by the Supreme Planning Board’s decision no. 2009/31 dated September 
29, 2009, and went into force after being published in the Official Gazette no. 27364, dated October 2, 2009. The 
administrative structure was regulated by the Prime Ministry’s Circular no. 27568 dated May 1, 2010.  IIFC Strat-
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The project was decided in 2009 by the central government. And it is currently in the phase of 
construction.
“The main project for the improvement of regional and international competitiveness of 
Istanbul is currently one of Istanbul International Finance Center. The objective is to promote 
Istanbul as the main financial center of the region and then an international leading financial 
center. Istanbul will compete with cities like Dubai, Moscow, and Abu Dhabi and perhaps later, 
with Paris, London and Barcelona.” (Interview with General Secretary of ISTKA - 02.04.2015)
Table 4. http://ifcturkey.madeinweb.com.tr/istanbul-international-financial-center/
egy and Action Plan consisting of 71 articles, prepared within the framework of Istanbul Financial Center Project 
carried out under the coordination of the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Development states priorities and actions 
aimed at developing a legal infrastructure up to international standards, adding to the diversity of financial products 
and services, simplifying and increasing the efficiency of the taxation system, improving the regulatory and super-
visory framework, strengthening the physical and technological infrastructure, providing a training infrastructure 
to meet the requirement for qualified human resources, and creating an organizational structure that will realize 
promotional and monitoring activities worldwide.  In consideration of the Strategy and Action Plan, IFC-Istanbul 
High Council (High Council), IFC-Istanbul National Advisory Committee (National Advisory Committee), IFC 
Istanbul Coordination Office (Coordination Office), Working Committees, and IFC International Advisory Com-
mittee (International Advisory Committee) to advise the High Council were established in order to coordinate, 
support and carry out the activities of Istanbul International Financial Center. Finally, “Istanbul International Fi-
nancial Center Priority Conversion Program” included in the Tenth Development Plan covering 2014-2018 aims at 
making Istanbul rank among the top 25 in the Global Financial Center Index, and making Turkey rank among the 
top 30 in the Financial Development Index by the year 2018. (http://ifcturkey.madeinweb.com.tr/istanbul-interna-
tional-financial-center/)
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The draft of Istanbul International Financial Center Project was decided in 2009 when ISTKA 
just has been created. So ISTKA, as a territorial institution, could not participate in this decision 
making process. However, the Ministry of Development who is the supervisor of RDAs in Turkey 
is a member of the Istanbul National Advisory Committee. Actually, ISTKA is a member of some 
working committees, with a limited advisor role.
If one can speculate, a question may arise easily: Does the Ministry of Economy, which is the 
principal holder of the project, would have collaborated with ISTKA from its preparation and its 
decision-making processes, if ISTKA had already completed its preliminary institutionalization 
process in 2009? The answer seems obvious. It is a project developed and decided from a strictly 
centralized logic. The only local contribution comes from the metropolitan municipality in 
the territorial laying out of the project. Moreover, according to a recent report regarding the 
management of the project, this centralized logic is challenged and a governance system that 
privileges a territorial management seems desired by the principal leaders of the project. The 
General Secretary of the ISTKA supports the idea of a decentralized management of the project 
because at this stage, the project is far from having achieved the expected progress according to 
its centralized management. 
“Certainly Ankara still has decision-making powers. Ankara controls everything. But the 
defects of this centralized management of the project were highlighted by the central authorities. 
Currently they are developing another system of governance, more territorial.” (Interview with 
General Secretary of ISTKA - 02.04.2015).
For global city-regions that become engines of their national economies, to promote the city 
and its image among international actors is an important tool in improving competitiveness. In 
this perspective, almost every global city-region has a document or a strategic plan that has the 
function of representing the city and to its promotion among foreign capital and international 
markets. For Istanbul, this is not the case. ISTKA, although it has been active for five years, failed 
to gathering local actors and institutions to prepare such a strategic document. This is due to 
weak coordination of Istanbul elites. Within the ISTKA, coordination of local actors regarding 
such collective work could not be established.
“We have very strong partners. However, since the creation of ISTKA, we have not been able 
to establish a collective synergy. Each of our partners has its own agenda and its own financial 
resources to act. I’ll give you an example: Istanbul Chamber of Commerce - ITO has an office in 
New York to promote Istanbul but ISTKA is not concerned. There are two weeks; representatives 
of the ITO went to the international real estate fair in Cannes. They spent 10 million TL for 
the preparation of a scale model of Istanbul. They asked us to finance the construction of that. 
They have promoted Istanbul in Cannes but no reference to ISTKA! In the public opinion, 
ISTKA is still considered an institution that only distributes money for the implementation 
of local projects. Our other functions and tasks are not sufficiently known.” (Interview with a 
technician of ISTKA - Istanbul Development Agency, 29.03.2015).
Furthermore, Investment Support Office of ISTKA is not very active in the promotion of Istanbul 
to foreign investors. Until today, the representatives of ISTKA did not realize an international visit 
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to make known to foreign actors strengths and potential of Istanbul. This is due to bureaucratic 
procedures that delayed the creation and then the operational actions of Investment Support 
Office.
Concluding Remarks
It is possible to admit that the creation of the RDAs in Turkey can be considered as a functional 
and institutional restructuring insofar as the state tends to territorialize its regional policy by 
delegating some of these competences to the RDAs and by making a relative decentralization 
policy supporting this trend. However, this economic regionalization policy is not based 
necessarily on regional political mobilizations. It would be interesting to reconsider the creation 
of RDAs in relation to the Kurdish question. In the south-eastern regions, Kurdish political 
movement seems not to approve the RDAs by its neoliberal and centralist structure that qualifies 
prefects as the heads of these institutions. Second, it is possible to accept that the concept of 
city-region or “entrepreneurial cities” can be emphasized in the context of spatial development 
policies in Turkey. Istanbul shows a good example with its territorial expansion at high speed 
and its political and financial capacities. Other major cities are all driven in the national but 
also international economic competition to take a more assertive role in the national and global 
economy. In this sense, the creation of the RDAs is an asset and a significant potential for these 
cities representing emergent territorial economies.
In fact, the creation of regional development agencies in Turkey has a dual function. The first is to 
decentralize regional planning policy. In this sense, the task appears to be relatively accomplished 
since the central authorities still tend to act in a centralist way that reduces the capacity of regional 
actors to express and implement the needs and goals of their own territory. Second function is to 
increase the competitiveness of regions not only in national level but also in international level. In 
Turkey, disadvantaged regions generally have limited financial resources. And the state does not 
establish an equitable distribution of funding between rich and poor regions. This appears to be 
inadequate with the logic of competitiveness which was passed into law establishing development 
agencies. Moreover, in the case of Istanbul, the most developed region of the country, poor 
coordination of local actors on the one hand, the failure to take into account the priorities and 
territorial specificities by the central authorities on the other, harm the competitiveness of the 
Istanbul region. Why create a development agency if you despise these capabilities and actions? 
The question must be asked.
Finally, it is possible to announce that a certain policy of economic regionalization is ongoing 
in Turkey. The attention given to the territories by the state can be observed through intensive 
mobilization of the idea and the projects of  “local development”. In this sense, Turkey seems to 
be associated with the imperative of globalization and decentralization process. However, the 
challenge is to find medium and long term if a real decentralization policy regarding territorial 
governance will be implemented or not. The current situation shows that the centralized 
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administrative culture is still alive and must give way to a more advanced system of governance. 
Thus, the regions can more easily mobilize its institutional, financial and political resources to 
become more competitive and successful in the global economy. 
We can admit that if Turkey wants to achieve the objectives of Vision 2023, it should comply with 
the new governance rules which now involve not only horizontal but also vertical aspect that 
requires better coordination of different levels of public action, promoting further delegation of 
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